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There has been a proliferation of handbooks lately, presumably because libraries continue 
to buy them even as their budgets shrink. Most handbooks are dutiful efforts to cover 
well-known fields, with deference to the major figures and ideas. The best, in contrast, 
help to define emerging fields, providing theory, language, exemplary cases, and methods 
for studying an aspect of reality that has previously been out of sight. The Routledge 
Handbook of Character Assassination and Reputation Management is in the latter 
category, putting the topic of character assassination (CA) firmly on the intellectual map 
through its diverse, sweeping, and often entertaining essays. 
Because this multidisciplinary book is intended to stake out intellectual territory 
and attract young scholars, rather than being a perfunctory exercise in coverage, the 
editors seem to have taken unusual care in the quality of the chapters, which are better 
written than the average handbook text. It helps that CA can be quite entertaining. Cases 
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from a range of regions and historical periods show the ubiquity of CA wherever politics 
involves persuasion – which is pretty much everywhere. We think of rhetoric as crucial in 
democracies, where voters must be influenced and citizens mobilized for wars, but 
persuasion also occurs in authoritarian regimes, albeit with smaller audiences (often only 
one person, the prince). 
Character assassination is an attack on the reputation, especially moral reputation, 
of another player in some strategic or competitive arena. CA is designed to weaken the 
target in some way, whether preventing them from making alliances, reducing others’ 
trust in them, deflating their own confidence and feelings of efficacy, cutting off desired 
resources, and so on. The targets can be individuals, usually those who already have a 
public reputation with certain audiences, but they can also be fictitious persons such as 
corporations, countries, political parties, ethnic-racial groups, genders, and really any 
category that can develop a group identity. CA against “the enemy” prepares countries for 
war; corporations use it against whistleblowers who threaten their reputation; CA is a 
central tool of electoral competition; it intimidates and humiliates oppressed groups to 
keep them in their place; it establishes our common-sense views of what is moral and 
immoral. Alongside encomium, CA is the core of rhetoric. 
One of the strengths of CA theory is that it encourages careful description of the 
arenas in which reputations are made. Thus Simon Burrows shows who benefited from 
sullying Marie-Antoinette’s reputation at court, why the gossip did not spill over into 
public opinion, and how a notorious criminal case eventually came to the Paris 
Parlement, which saw a chance to undermine royal authority. CA draws on classic 
rhetoric, which was always keen to establish what the intended impacts of speeches were, 
on what audiences.  
I bring a special lens to CA, namely a scheme of character theory (developed in a 
recent book called Public Characters), intended to understand how reputations are 
created in politics by drawing on traditional literary tropes based on several basic 
dimensions: whether a character is strong or weak, good or bad (and active or passive, 
although this third dimension is less central). Heroes are strong and good, villains are 
strong and bad, victims good but weak, minions bad and weak. These characters animate 
a variety of plots: for instance, heroes can betray us, villains can convert to our side, 
victims can gain the strength to be heroes, and most familiar of all, heroes save victims 
from villains. Character tropes are powerful cultural accomplishments because they tell 
us how we are supposed to feel about them, almost by definition: we fear villains, admire 
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heroes (even if we do not especially like them), pity victims, and feel contempt for 
minions. 
CA theory focuses on one type of character work: the construction of a villain or 
minion, especially the demotion of heroes to immoral statuses. Character theory suggests 
in addition that we distinguish between villains and minions: CA can attack someone’s 
strength, making them appear weak and ridiculous, or it can attack someone’s morality, 
making them appear malevolent. Different ingredients go into the two portraits, and there 
is a dilemma as to which is more effective: if you portray your opponents as villains, they 
are threatening and dangerous, and there is urgency to stopping them; if you portray them 
as silly and contemptuous, they are less immediately threatening, too weak to do much 
unless they team up with a true villain. Because CA theory tends to focus on the moral 
dimension it does not clearly distinguish villains and minions. 
We might pose this as a question for character assassination theory: when does CA 
take the form of pointing out villains, dangerous and strong, and when does it instead 
take the form of ridicule, reducing targets to weak and laughable minions? 
Character work constructs two characters: that of the target but also that of the 
orator or character worker. In the handbook this is clear, for instance, in the case of Xi 
Jinping, whose campaign to “clean up” the military and government made him into a hero 
at the same time that it generated a series of corrupt villains or minions (depending on 
how much strength was attributed to them). Numbering more than 100,000, the targets 
were necessarily more often minions than villains. Only a handful of targets rose to the 
status of well-known villains. Character assassination was not only about shaping 
reputations, it was also about the elimination of Xi’s rivals and opponents. Jennifer 
Keohane similarly demonstrates that Edmund R. Murrow’s attack on Joe McCarthy 
worked because of the reputation that Murrow had already built for himself as a heroic, 
trustworthy journalist, able to withstand McCarthy’s counter-attack. 
CA is an unsavory act that can tarnish the reputation of its creator as well as that 
of the target. Astute players often ask others to attack their opponents, especially 
politicians who wish to protect their own moral reputations. Thus we read about Richard 
Nixon’s extensive range of surrogates, from Vice President Spiro Agnew on down, who 
undertook CA on his behalf. Leaks via anonymous sources in the White House served the 
same function. 
By focusing on one type of character work, CA tends to overlook contests over 
reputation, for instance those typical of electoral contests. In such cases, one side’s villain 
is the other side’s hero. Each side’s publicists do the appropriate work. Projecting your 
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leader as a hero is partly independent of assassinating your opponent’s character. 
Typically these contests are over the moral dimension: who is better? Both sides may 
agree on a person’s strength: those trying to demonize her, and those trying to portray her 
as a hero. Some contributors, such as William Benoit, recognize these binary conflicts, 
but few authors balance attention to negative character work with the equally important 
realm of positive character work. 
In addition to the contrast between villains and heroes, there is a subtle arithmetic 
relationship between villains and victims. The more innocent or weak the victims, the 
more egregious is the villain who attacks them. Benoit again acknowledges this, but 
greater attention to the construction of victims would advance our understanding of why 
some cases of CA are more effective than others. CA needs to demonstrate the purity of 
the victims as well as the villain’s motives and character. 
Both CA and character theory address the relationship between a person’s actions 
and reputation. A lot of character work, including character assassination, attempts to 
portray an action as indicative of a person’s underlying character, as following from her 
inherent goodness or badness, weakness or strength. This works better on the moral 
dimension: a moral transgression can devastate a person’s moral reputation, whereas a 
sign of weakness does not necessarily permanently disqualify someone. If a politician is 
caught in a lie, that is usually worse for her reputation than her trip to the hospital for 
exhaustion. (Unless that exhaustion can be attributed to ongoing mental health flaws or 
creeping dementia; in this way a broken ankle from a skiing accident may be less 
vulnerable to being reworked into a character weakness than fatigue.) 
One ongoing debate in CA is apparently over whether only human individuals can 
have reputations or characters. This seems odd to me, since we commonly attribute 
character and characteristics to quasi-human entities, especially groups. Timothy 
Coombs and Sherry Holladay make a sensible argument that organizations have 
reputations that can be assassinated much as individuals do, and Neofytos Aspriadis, 
Emmanouil Takas, and Athanassios N. Samaras extend the idea to nations. Prejudices 
and stereotypes against groups incorporate the same cultural materials that we deploy 
against individuals: are they trustworthy, strong, or active? Modern wars require vast 
mobilizations that depend on demonizing “the enemy,” whether the purpose is to recruit 
soldiers, sell government bonds, or encourage citizens to tolerate wartime hardship.  
CA occurs in strikingly different arenas. Compare a political campaign and 
anonymous comments on the Internet. The motives behind CA are obvious in the former, 
less so in the latter. Efforts to explain the latter in fact lead the volume into a rare false 
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note of pop psychology. The horrified reaction to the notorious killing of Cecil the lion by 
a midwestern dentist is dismissed as “driven by individuals’ urges to demonstrate their 
own morality, their own values, and their own ecological ethic.” It is an unfortunate 
formulation, scorning the idea that people may actually be shocked and indignant over a 
moral transgression and instead portraying that outrage as an effort to feel better about 
themselves. It harks back to discredited Freudian theories that attributed most emotions 
to internal repair work rather than reasonable efforts to deal with the surrounding 
environment. Indignation against a dentist who killed a lion becomes irrational 
scapegoating, ignoring how culture works through symbols that focus our attention. 
I have an untested hunch that characters are more universal than the stereotypes 
about groups that every culture harbors. In order to obtain and exercise their rights, 
oppressed groups must present themselves as heroes, good and strong. Their oppressors 
try to paint them as evil and/or weak. Each side thus faces dilemmas in their character 
work: oppressed groups must balance the strength of heroes with the compassion 
typically due victims, and they organize to transform themselves from victims into heroes. 
In excluding others, elites must choose whether to portray them as strong and bad villains 
or to dismiss them as silly, inept minions. (Throughout US history, for instance, white 
portrayals of Black Americans have bounced between ridicule and fear, with contempt 
and mockery the default mode until slaves revolt or Black citizens mobilize to demand 
their rights, when they become powerful villains.) 
Like much cultural analysis in the humanities and social sciences, the study of CA 
draws heavily from the insights of classical rhetoric. Unlike most of that analysis, these 
authors generally acknowledge the debt, perhaps because several are in departments of 
communications and rhetoric. CA theories are richer for making the debt overt. On the 
other hand, images appear in only a couple chapters. One chapter on internet memes has 
some great examples, although – like so much work on the internet – it seems to assume 
that caricature and other pithy visual character work was invented in the digital age. Yet 
visual tools are central in character work, efficient means of suggesting how strong, good, 
or active a person is. CA has already proven its utility; it will contribute even more as its 
insights are applied to other characters and other plots. 
 
